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Background: Pressures on health care budgets have led policy makers to discuss how to balance the provision of
costly technologies to populations in need and making coverage decisions under uncertainty. Coverage with
evidence development (CED) is being employed to meet these challenges.
Methods: Twenty-four interviews were carried out between June 2009 and December 2010 with researchers,
decision makers and policy makers from Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States. Three phases of
coding occurred, the first being manual coding where the interviews were read and notes were taken and nodes
were extracted and imputed. NVIVO coding was applied to the interview transcripts, with both broad general
searches for word usages and imputed nodes.
Results: Four overarching thematic areas emerged out of contextual analysis of the interviews – (1) what
constitutes CED; (2) the lack of a systematic approach/governance structure; (3) the role of the pharmaceutical
industry and overt political considerations in CED; and (4) alternatives and barriers to CED. We explore these themes
and then use concrete examples of CED projects in each of the four countries to illustrate the political issues that
our interviewees raised.
Conclusion: Until the underlying political nature of CED is recognized then fundamental questions about its
usefulness and operation will remain unresolved.
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In 1848, Rudolph Virchow stated that, “medicine is a so-
cial science, and politics is nothing else but medicine on a
large scale” [1]. We are currently bearing witness to an in-
verse example of Virchow’s reasoning in a new scheme,
aptly called coverage with evidence development (CED) or
access with evidence development (AED) (the two terms
are used interchangeably). Pressures on health care bud-
gets have led policy makers and key stakeholders to move
into discussions around how to balance the provision of
costly innovative technologies to populations in need with
making coverage decisions under uncertainty. This is* Correspondence: jlexchin@yorku.ca
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumwhere CED enters the debate, representing an instance
whereby medicine is nothing else than politics on a large
scale. Here we are using the term “politics” to mean the
interests that the various stakeholders (industry, govern-
ment, patient groups, professional associations) bring to
the table and how they intersect in coming to a final deci-
sion. These interests are in evidence when stakeholders
are negotiating both about whether or not to undertake a
CED study and the conditions under which a particular
product will be funded.
CED is an umbrella term for institutions and policy
think tanks to capture the essence of various evidence de-
velopment approaches. It is a mechanism for going be-
yond a binary yes/no decision about coverage for new
technologies or drugs by offering coverage in the context
of prospective studies [2]. It provides an alternative “inCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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pear to meet the standard criteria for reimbursement, pre-
dominantly because of uncertainty surrounding the existing
evidence base and when additional data collection could re-
duce this uncertainty” [3].
According to Menon et al. [4], variations on the ap-
proach are placed at times under the auspices of terms
such as ‘only in research,’ ‘pragmatic trials,’ ‘comparative ef-
fectiveness research,’ ‘field evaluation,’ ‘policy trials,’ and
‘real time monitoring’. As Hutton and colleagues claim,
“Coverage with Evidence Development is one of several
policy options that have been posited to overcome prob-
lems associated with making coverage decisions under un-
certainty” [5]. Indeed, though not entirely new or novel,
CED is the approach that has attracted the most attention
from policy makers and is also the one with the largest
amount of literature.
In over fifteen years of research on CED since 1995, the
study design, desired outcomes, and the application of con-
ditions or agreement on a particular conditionality remain
neither straightforward nor standardized [6]. In general,
CED is understood to comprise two different typologies.
The first is where “payers provided interim funding for a
technology . . . to be used in a clinical study intended to
collect information needed to reduce decision-making
uncertainties (i.e. coverage as part of a clinical study)” [7].
The second are those cases “based on some form of
outcomes guarantee implemented through contractual ar-
rangements between payers and manufacturers (i.e. cover-
age with outcomes guarantee)” [7]. In this paper we focus
only on the former definition, i.e., defining CED as a
process that uses data from provisionally covered popula-
tions to determine whether to continue coverage, expand
or contract it and under what conditions.
CED is often presented as a seemingly neutral alterna-
tive or antidote to the challenge of funding under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Its delivery mechanisms indicate
much promise for achieving the mandate of simultan-
eously allowing access to more diffusive health technolo-
gies whilst maintaining evaluative mechanisms to assess
their benefit and efficacy. “CED permits provisional cover-
age of selected treatments lacking adequate evidence of
benefits and risks in the context of planned research to de-
velop the evidence needed to determine whether definitive
coverage is warranted” [6]. In the end, decisions about how
to spend scarce resources need to be made and, regardless
of the methods used to push ahead, in circumstances of
decision-making and defining a legitimate scope, power
and politics always intermingle with evidence. Though it is
a promising alternative, broaching a policy for CED is an
inherently political process whereby “the legitimate scope
of CED, however, remains poorly defined” [6].
The interviews on which this study is based emerged
out of an attempt to further understand how variousstakeholders perceive both the potential and the chal-
lenges of CED with a view to gauging what is needed when
moving forward, such as processes required to help define
the legitimate scope of CED and to build the governance
structures of CED. Interviews allow us to explore the com-
plexities of CED in more depth than could be achieved
just through documentary review or a study of the cur-
rently published literature. The literature on CED has
talked about it as a political process, but this level of dis-
cussion tends to be peripheral to its other aspects.
The aim in undertaking the analysis of the interviews is
to take the debate about CED in a novel direction by
examining its tensions and complexities in light of the
exercise of power relations, asking how these shape what
becomes knowledge and how that knowledge is
interpreted into the decisions that result from CED
schemes. Specifically we are interested in CED as it re-
lates to decisions about pharmaceuticals. We dissect the
interviews to extract selected themes that we think al-
lows for a fuller understanding of the political undercur-
rents in the decision-making process, and the relations of
power that determine how and under what circum-
stances CED is used. We then link these themes to CED
projects that have been undertaken to illustrate its essen-
tial political nature.Methods
The British Columbia Coverage with Evidence Develop-
ment (CED) project is a two-year research endeavor re-
ceiving funds from the College of Pharmacists of British
Columbia. The purpose of the project is to gain an un-
derstanding of the barriers associated with planning,
implementing and evaluating CED-related research. In
addition, the project intends to describe and investigate
the unresolved policy issues around covering pharma-
ceuticals with evidence development.
This portion of the research project involved interviews
with a variety of stakeholders (researchers, policy makers
and decision makers). These actors were deliberately
chosen as their perspectives would allow for an investiga-
tion of the spectrum of policy issues associated with
CED-type research and generate key “lessons learned”
from international and Canadian experience with CED.
Researchers, typically based in academic institutions,
were defined as those who were concretely involved in
the design, conduct and evaluation of studies on CED or
the management of data used in CED studies. Policy
makers were those who provided advice about how CED
should be used in the decision-making process and fi-
nally decision makers were those who worked in govern-
ment funded agencies and who took the evidence
generated from the studies to make a final decision about
funding the drug or technology.
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quiries with members of the International AED working
group, and subsequent interviewees were identified
through snowball sampling and internet searches. We
chose candidates for interviews based on a reading of
the literature on CED and to reflect the countries that
had the most experience in the area [7,8]. We restricted
our choices to English speaking countries due to lan-
guage limitations among the people conducting the in-
terviews. The interviewees were involved in CED for
technology, e.g., evaluation of positron emission tomog-
raphy scanning and implantable cardiac defibrillators,
for surgical procedures, e.g., lung reduction surgery, and
for pharmaceuticals. We used a semi-structured inter-
view guide with common questions for all categories of
interviewees and then specific questions depending on
their specific role. Open-ended questions allowed inter-
viewees to elaborate on particular areas that they
regarded as important. A total of six different individuals
conducted interviews, with most interviews conducted
by two (AC and RH).
A total of 24 interviews (approximately 45-minutes each)
took place between June 2009 and December 2010. Most
of these interviews were conducted by phone and the
resulting interview notes were analyzed to identify themes
and policy issues. With permission, some of the interviews
were recorded for the purpose of post-interview note tak-
ing. We used a grounded theory approach to extract
themes from the interviews [9]. Interview transcripts were
first manually coded and entered into NVIVO data analysis
(version 9) through identification of nodes and themes.
Three phases of coding occurred, the first being manual
coding where the interviews were read and notes were
taken and nodes were extracted and imputed. NVIVO cod-
ing was applied to the interview transcripts, with both
broad general searches for word usages and imputed nodes.
This method generated varied themes and sub-thematic
areas that captured the essence of the debate. A single au-
thor (DB) initially coded the interviews and the second au-
thor (JL) subsequently independently read and coded them
to ensure that all key themes were captured. Interviews
were iteratively read until thematic saturation was reached.
Any differences were resolved through discussion until con-
sensus was reached.
Interviewees were promised anonymity in any publication
and as a result we only identify them by their role in the
process and the country where they work, i.e., researcher,
decision maker or policy maker and Australia, Canada,
United Kingdom (UK) or United States (US). Any other
parts of the interview that might identify them, e.g., specific
place of work, the name of drug or device has also been re-
moved. The sponsor played no role in the design of the
questionnaire, the conduct of the interviews, their analysis
or the writing of the manuscript. Ethics approval wasreceived from the Human Participants Review Committee
at York University.Results and discussion
Of the 24 individuals who were interviewed 16 were re-
searchers, 5 decision makers and 3 policy makers. These in-
dividuals came from Australia (4), Canada (11), UK (7) US
(2). Interviewees from Australia, the UK and the US were
almost exclusively working in the area of pharmaceuticals
except for one from the UK and one from Australia, who
concentrated on technology and procedures, respectively.
The plurality (4) of the Canadians worked in the drug area,
3 worked in technology, 3 in drugs and technology and 1
worked on both drugs and procedures.
Although interviewees were involved in CED in differ-
ent areas and spoke about their different experiences we
consciously selected observations and opinions that
could be applied to our focus on pharmaceuticals.
Four overarching thematic areas emerged out of context-
ual analysis of the interviews – (1) what constitutes CED;
(2) the lack of a systematic approach/governance structure;
(3) the role of the pharmaceutical industry and overt polit-
ical considerations in CED; and (4) alternatives and barriers
to CED. In identifying and the explaining these themes we
use selective quotations from the interviewees to help illus-
trate the points that they are making and to allow them to
express their opinions in their own words.
The following sections expand on these areas by identify-
ing subthemes contained in each broad theme. (See Table 1
for a summary of the key points.) It should be noted that
although these themes are presented as separate they are all
interrelated, reflecting the complexity of CED.
What constitutes CED?
Perceptions of CED differ widely between the interviewees
according to their roles and involvement in research,
decision-making, and policy development. Interestingly,
interviewees from all three categories seemingly suggest
agreement on what CED is not, such as “Evaluations of
products that are already on the market, like insulin
pumps in Ontario, are not CED” (Canada Researcher 1).
The debate largely revolves around how to constitute what
it actually is, reflecting a grey area in which differing de-
scriptions of what distinguishes studies that are CED, and
those that are not, emerge to create some tension amongst
stakeholders. For instance, one policy maker observed that
although his group did safety studies of already marketed
drugs he questioned if this fit the definition of CED
(Canada Policy Maker 1). A researcher felt the same way
stating “evaluations of products that are already on the
market. . .are not CED” (Canada Researcher 1).
Given the general feeling that CED should not deal with
existing drugs and devices, three lingering questions
Table 1 Key points from the interviews
Theme Subtheme Key points
What constitutes CED What is worthy of research • Conditionality is most important, e.g., drug
or device, characteristic of disease
What constitutes uncertainty
and how should it be measured
• Determining uncertainty is an art
What constitutes evidence
and how should it be managed
• How much agreement should there be on
minimum evidence expectations
• CED can become a never ending series of studies
Lack of a systematic
approach/governance structure
Role of different stakeholders • Where should leadership rest
• Over involvement of multiple stakeholders
• Engage disease advocacy groups
Translation of research into policy • Requires guidelines and a discontinuation policy
• Limited data and financial considerations are barriers
• Justifying the continued flow of funds requires
policy standardization and a formal agreement
of the strategy to be put in place
Corporate influence and overt politics in
CED
The political process as part of CED • Political processes in terms of the source of money
and decision-making are at a level above researchers
• Political processes can undermine the ability to
achieve real change
• Researchers blame policy makers and decision
makers for problems in translating research into policy
The role of the pharmaceutical
industry
• Researchers, policy makers and decision
makers are all skeptical about the role of industry
Alternatives and barriers to CED Alternatives • Preference expressed for risk-sharing
and tax breaks over CED
Barriers – data and privacy issues • Concern that decision makers are
not willing to be accountable
• Doctors not cooperative enough
• Need better access to data and the ability to link
databases
• Registries useful but come with their own set of problems
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of) uncertainty needed to move ahead with this approach;
second, the conditions that would allow the approach to
unfold; and third, the deliberations driving the evidence
base that is, at the end, the point of introducing the
innovation. As one interviewee put it:
“Some people see it as a way to bypass the regular stan-
dards and others see it as an easy way to get something in
that they’ll never get out. . .It is less about evidence and
about the system” (Canada Researcher 5).
Although one decision maker called CED a policy tool
(Canada Decision Maker 1), another termed it a research
tool (UK Decision Maker 1), while a researcher was more
practical in calling it an evaluation tool (Canada Research
1). At the core of the discussion are differing perceptions
regarding both the definitional and methodological issues
and, as well, the scope of CED. We further dissect these
facets of debate within three interrelated themes that il-
lustrate the boundary issues: what is worthy of research,what constitutes uncertainty and what constitutes
evidence?
i. What is worthy of research?
“Is putting off a decision a reason to use CED? Is that an
incentive?” While one interviewee answered ambiguously
but without hesitation by stating “Probably” (Canada Re-
searcher 4), another believed that circumstances alone de-
fined what is and is not worthy of CED, e.g., what is the
character of the disease and the population that it affects
(UK Policy Maker 1). In short, the challenge in moving
forward is ascertaining the conditionality. For instance,
when an institutional report states “Yes” to a particular
drug or device it is usually done so at the discretion of
adding a disclaimer: “but, with a certain number of condi-
tions.” However, these conditions are not necessarily con-
sistent – they may be made on an ad-hoc basis (Canada
Decision Maker 1), or they may depend on whether the
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searcher 1).
ii. What constitutes uncertainty and how should it be
measured?
On the one hand CED is considered a way of managing
uncertainty –“that’s all that it is” (Australia Decision
Maker 1). But what actually constitutes uncertainty is not
straightforward as it is inherently linked to issues of risk,
safety and evaluation. As one interviewee eloquently said,
“There are rules for creating evidence but when push
comes to shove, it’s an art [evaluating evidence]” (US Deci-
sion Maker 1).
iii. What constitutes evidence and how should it be
managed?
At the crux of the dilemma of defining uncertainty is
the evidence on the efficacy, effectiveness and safety of
new technologies. Evidence-based research must begin
with questions, and this is part of the debate regarding
CED; can people agree on the minimum evidence expec-
tations and do those concerns include just effectiveness
or, in addition, safety?
“The message that came across early was that the deci-
sion makers have to drive this. . .[They] need to decide
what they want to know” (Canada Researcher 5).
“When we decide on CED we have to be fairly certain
about safety” (US Decision Maker 1).
There is also the worry that CED can become a never-
ending series of studies. How much evidence is enough? For
instance, if CED is begun on one product and before this re-
search is completed a second drug for the same problem is
marketed, should the CED be abandoned or extended to in-
clude the newer product (Australia Researcher 1)?
Lack of a systematic approach/governance structure
CED lacks a governance structure, or a systematic ap-
proach. As one interviewee noted, “schemes are malleable
post implementation. . .[it has] a controversial typology
and is ad hoc” (UK Researcher 4). Another mentioned that
it is ad hoc and “needs structure and protocol” or “a deci-
sion maker’s field guide or a tool kit” (Canada Researcher
5). Beyond ascertaining uncertainty, three aspects of gov-
ernance or approach to CED act as barriers and contribute
to the difficulty in establishing norms.
i. Role of different stakeholders
With respect to CED, researchers took contradictory
positions around where the leadership should rest. Al-
though one opined that it would be better for clinicians
to be in a leadership position with respect to CED, ratherthan leaving it to government (Australia Researcher 3), an-
other noted that clinicians, i.e., researchers, were more in-
terested in using the technology than in generating
evidence about it (UK Researcher 5). A third conflicting
opinion maintained that researchers can contribute to de-
veloping the methodology around CED but it is up to “de-
cision makers to decide what they want to know. It means
that you are getting them to ask the right questions”
(Canada Researcher 5). But, what are the right questions?
A fourth felt that there was over involvement of multiple
stakeholders in running CED studies; this interviewee
identified a wide variety of organizations and groups in-
cluding the pharmaceutical industry, the department of
health, patient groups and clinicians (UK Researcher 2).
Finally, a UK decision maker singled out the need to also
engage disease advocacy groups so as to be able to demon-
strate to them that their involvement was sought (UK De-
cision Maker 1).
ii. Translation of research into policy
The role of different stakeholders is inherently linked to
the difficulty in translating research into policy or
implementing policy. This process requires guidelines and
a firm grounding in not only what constitutes evidence or
efficacy but, also as one interviewee held, “in order to look
into effectiveness or efficacy, we need a discontinuation
policy because we don’t know the benefit [before the drug
is tested]” (Australia Decision Maker 1).
Limited data and financial considerations are also
barriers.
“If the research leads to a decision that a new technology
should be implemented, but the budget is not available for
implementation, this is a barrier” (Canada Researcher 1).
“The rules of the game need to be set up front. . .There
has to be an explicit understanding, the public and every-
one else, that if it doesn’t perform you are going to pull
the money” (Canada Researcher 3).
Justifying the continued flow of funds requires policy
standardization and a formal agreement of the strategy to
be put in place; currently it is a cyclical schema that has a
lot of holes. Indeed, making conscious and collective deci-
sions around evaluation and cost and measuring certainty
are highly difficult. The politics and history undergirding
the lack of agreement acts as a strong barrier to doing so
and impacts the translation of CED.
“There’s nothing more complicated than making a
decision. . .We have decades of bad behavior of making
decisions [by the Ministry of Health] based on a whim or
ad hocing” (Canada Researcher 3).
Corporate influence and overt politics in CED
The translation of evidence into policy is riddled with
political and economic considerations, both the overt
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pharmaceutical industry.
i. The political process as part of CED
The most explicit evidence of relations of power comes
from the hierarchy of roles in the decision-making process.
Researchers from both Canada (Canada Researcher 2) and
the UK (UK Researcher 1) identified political influences as
being above them in terms of both determining where the
money for CED will come from and where the ultimate
decision-making comes from. This echoes the contentious
theme that even though political processes may help re-
searchers get funding for their projects they can also under-
mine the ability to achieve any real change (Canada
Researcher 5). As one researcher identified, there are imbal-
ances and risks inherent in the governance of CED. In
some instances agreements make “it possible for parties of
the scheme to rewrite the rules subsequently,” which is a
dangerous practice that places the resources that the society
or health system puts into the scheme at increased risk
(UK Researcher 4). Finally, with the difficulties and barriers
taken together, researchers tended to blame decision and
policy makers for the trouble they encounter in translating
the evidence gained through CED into policy. Not only be-
cause of the perceived flaws in the research.
(US Researcher 1) but because agreement on decision-
making, as opposed to being ‘ad hoc’ is imperative: “once
you let something out, you can’t get it back” (UK Re-
searcher 3).
ii. The role of the pharmaceutical industry
Decision makers, policy makers and researchers all
voiced some level of criticism about the role of the
pharmaceutical industry in CED. A policy maker
remarked
“There is one. . .registry they [the industry] are inter-
ested in. . .It’s also got industry funding – we are trying
to work out how to analyze the data and manage the
conflicts of interest” (Canada Policy Maker 1).
A researcher felt that “the pharmaceutical industry is
trying to get away with things” (UK Researcher 5) and
these same sentiments were reflected in what a decision
maker said.
“It’s more the industry-sponsored studies that we have
to vet carefully” (US Decision Maker 1).
Alternatives and barriers to CED
i. Alternatives
One Australian decision maker felt that there were
better approaches to managing uncertainties than usingCED approaches. This person was in favor of using risk-
sharing because it took the responsibility from the payer
and shared it with the sponsor. This decision maker would
rather “get the structures right, so we can interrogate data
as is appropriate and have everyone have confidence in
that interrogation” (Australia Decision Maker 1). Another
Australian, in this case a researcher, also talked favorably
about risk-sharing by identifying a disadvantage of CED.
With CED, this person stated, there “is the potential of
investing [in] technology that might later not be cost-
effective [or] proved to have safety issues” (Australia Re-
searcher 2). These preferences for an alternative to CED
from Australian informants may reflect the relative suc-
cesses of the long-standing use of pharmacoeconomic
evaluations by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS)
[10]. Meanwhile, a UK researcher advocated an entirely
different approach and held a different rationale for his
views.
“So I would do things like give bigger tax breaks to R&D
process[es] that follow a rational analysis and set a high
threshold for an expected health gain in order to [get]
something from Phase 2 to Phase 3 [drug trials]” (UK Re-
searcher 4).
ii. Barriers – data and privacy issues
People from different backgrounds laid the blame for
problems with CED on different target groups. One re-
searcher was critical of decision makers.
“There is basically a general commitment to appearing
to be accountable that is primarily financial and media –
don’t look stupid and don’t spend money that you
shouldn’t be spending” (Canada Researcher 6).
On-the-other hand, a decision maker laid much of the
blame for the difficulties in doing CED on physicians’ prob-
lems in collecting data and asking people to sign informed
consent forms (Canada Decision Maker 2). There was also
a structural issue that was identified, namely the access to
data and the privacy issues that this entails. There was a
general agreement that, in order to successfully undertake
CED, it is necessary to have better access to data and to be
able to link databases. We “need info as an evaluation tool”
(Canada Researcher 1). “We are looking at standardizing
data elements across all our registries and they are all aimed
at being in line with the national health data dictionary”
(Australia Researcher 3). Thus, registries were identified as
one key method of collecting the needed data by all cat-
egories of interviewees (Canada Policy Maker 2, Canada
Researchers 3 & 4, US Decision Maker 1). However, with
registries comes the problem of finding a sustainable
funding model for them, verifying the accuracy, reliability
and completeness of the information (Australia Researcher
3) and, as well, ensuring the privacy of the information that
is stored (Canada Policy Maker 1, Canada Researcher 5).
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solved issues with CED. Hutton and colleagues discussed
the dominant logistical advantages and disadvantages of
CED. Making decisions about coverage too early in the
lifecycle of a product may lead to paying for clinically or
cost-ineffective products; waiting too long may harm pa-
tients who could have benefited from the product [5].
Lexchin [8] focused on the problem of limited data for
pharmaceuticals as the reason for undertaking CED.
There are also inherent ethical challenges to CED ap-
proaches that were summarized in the proceedings from
a symposium held in Banff, Alberta in February 2009. As
one example, once a decision has been made to fund a
drug or device under CED, regardless of the evidence, it
becomes exceptionally difficult to discontinue the
funding [11].
All of these questions are inherently political in nature
but none have been approached from a primary political
perspective. We take as our trajectory the sentiment of
one interviewee: “. . .it is less about evidence and [more]
about the system” (Canada Researcher 5). We recognize
that our interviewees come from multiple backgrounds
and that the CED process in the four countries may have
national differences, e.g., who funds the studies, what level
of government has the decision making power. Yet, we
also believe that the political tensions, reflected in the in-
terests of the different parties, undergirding CED are com-
mon to all countries and that these commonalities
ultimately transcend any of the national variations. It is
the political tensions that are the focus of our analysis. In
undertaking this analysis we draw on examples of CED
projects from various countries, not in an attempt to
criticize the process or any particular group, but to ground
and further illustrate the themes that have emerged from
our interviews.
All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has ef-
fects, and in that sense at least, ‘becomes true.’ Knowledge,
once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails con-
straint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus,
there is no power relation without the correlative constitu-
tion of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does
not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power re-
lations [12].
Our interviewees identified two key tensions, the first
being how the various stakeholders can affect political de-
cisions around initiating a CED project and, the second,
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry in CED.
These issues are illustrated in the CED project that the
British Columbia (BC) government initiated into drugs for
Alzheimer’s Disease. The Alzheimer‘s Drug Therapy Ini-
tiative (ADTI), begun in 2007, was designed to provide
data on the safety, effectiveness and appropriate use of the
cholinesterase inhibitor class of drugs in the treatment of
dementia and to inform government policy on thecoverage of these drugs [13]. People intimately involved
with the ADTI acknowledged that the project would never
have been started without direct and indirect pressure from
the pharmaceutical industry on government, physicians,
Alzheimer’s Disease interests groups, and Alzheimer’s pa-
tients and their families. The provincial government had
previously rejected funding for this group of drugs, yet was
undergoing pressure to cover them, BC being the last prov-
ince in the country to do so. Other people from the ADTI
reinforced the observation by our interviewees that once
the BC government started to pay for these drugs it would
be very hard to reverse its decision regardless of the evi-
dence around effectiveness. Although money for the CED
project comes entirely from the Ministry of Health, the
companies making the 3 drugs being studied provide the
Ministry with funds equal to the cost of the first three
months therapy of their drug for each patient. The com-
panies are also funding educational sessions for doctors on
the proper diagnosis and treatment of Alzheimer’s Disease
and are assisting with patient recruitment. Thus, the close
working relationship amongst the industry, the physicians
and the consumer groups connected to the ADTI has
caused some, but not all people, to question how much the
integrity of scientific research and the academic freedom of
individual researchers are or will be affected by these ties
(Alan Cassels, personal communication).
The question of the involvement of the pharmaceutical
industry is also illustrated in an Australian study looking
at bosentan, a drug for the treatment of pulmonary ar-
terial hypertension (PAH). Eight of nine authors of the
main outcome study had a significant relationship with
Actelion Pharmaceuticals, the maker of the drug [14].
While there is no evidence that this level of COI biased
the findings of the study it still raises concerns given
previous research into the association between author
COI and the outcome of clinical research [15,16]. The
bosentan study involved the creation of a patient registry
and raises the political issues inherent in registries –
who will govern the registry, how will privacy be
safeguarded, who will have access to the data and where
will the funding to maintain a registry come from [17].
Australian and British interviewees raised the question
about whether CED was actually the best approach to
take in getting new and cost-effective drugs funded.
Australia required bosentan to undergo a CED evalu-
ation in order to be funded under its PBS. But, since
bosentan was listed, at least 4 other treatments for PAH
have also been listed on the PBS without a CED require-
ment. According to a meta-analysis, some of the more
recent products appear to offer mortality benefits that
bosentan doesn’t [18]. This outcome raises a number of
issues – was the time and the money for the bosentan
CED wasted, why were the other products listed without
undergoing CED, why is bosentan still being listed if
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about these decisions from a political perspective, it
seems reasonable to expect that there are political un-
dertones to the answers to some of these questions.
A number of informants identified questions as to the
purpose of CED, the role of different stakeholders in the
governance of a CED project, and the process for funding
a study. These issues come to the fore in the Canadian
Fabry Disease Initiative that was initially conceived of as a
10-year study of enzyme replacement where two different
versions of the enzyme were available for people with a
deficiency of alpha galactosidase. The project itself appears
to have been initiated at least in part as a result of patients
with Fabry Disease lobbying for government payment for
a drug that can cost C$300,000 annually per person [19].
Funding for the project came from the two companies
making the enzyme, the provincial and territorial govern-
ments and Health Canada, the latter of which agreed to
fund the study for three years with the money adminis-
tered through the Canadian Institutes for Health Research
(CIHR). At the end of the 3 years Health Canada an-
nounced that it was terminating its share of the funding –
putting the entire project into question. CIHR additionally
refused to become the study sponsor because it was not
the funder [20]. Access to the confidential 3-year funding
agreement has been withheld even from the researchers.
Moreover, there is even a dispute between the Canadian
Organization for Rare Diseases (CORD), the group
representing the patients, and Health Canada as to the rea-
son for the study. CORD claims that the study is being
done only because governments refused to fund an expen-
sive therapy while Health Canada maintains that its pur-
pose is to learn more about the effects of the drugs and “to
better understand the research challenges associated with
drugs that treat small populations” [19]. Investigators have
been unable to amend the trial protocol because any
changes have to be approved by all provinces providing
funding, the two companies and the research ethics boards
at each of the nine study sites [21].
Questions posed around evidence, such as how much
evidence is enough and how does the evidence affect
decision-making, all are raised by the problems identi-
fied in the multiple sclerosis (MS) risk sharing scheme
running in the UK since 2002. At the end of 2009 the
first report from the scheme appeared documenting the
status of patients during 2005–7. The patients on ther-
apy fared far worse than those on placebo. This should
have triggered a reduction in the price being paid for the
two drugs being examined according to the trial agree-
ment. Instead the report claimed that “the scientific ad-
visory group considered that it was premature at this
stage to reach any decision about re-pricing the drugs
without further follow-up and analyses” [22]. The two
companies making the different drugs were part of theadvisory committee that recommended not changing the
price. This decision, although defended by some [23],
highlights the point about how evidence can be used, or
misused to the (dis)advantage of some. A team from the
Sheffield School of Health and Related Research was ori-
ginally designated to monitor patient outcomes but later
withdrew from its role over concerns about governance of
the project and the arrangements for data access and pub-
lication rights [22]. As of June 2010 there have been no
further annual reports published on the scheme, again re-
inforcing the point around the control of evidence. Finally,
the MS scheme makes the point that evidence comes at a
cost and that spending the money is always a political de-
cision. The annual cost is close to £50 million (US$78 mil-
lion) which Raftery asserts may make it “the most
expensive publicly funded ongoing health related study in
the UK” [22].
The US CED project that examined the use of high-dose
chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant
for women with breast cancer is an example of how
decision-making around what should be eligible for CED
becomes warped and how public pressure can change the
nature of studies. Although there was very little evidence
that this type of approach actually worked, the high profile
of breast cancer, and its often dismal outcome, lead Blue
Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) to offer coverage for the
procedure to the 4 million federal employees that it cov-
ered. An evidence-based review undertaken by the BCBS
Technology Evaluation Center triggered the initiation of a
project to evaluate the effectiveness of this new therapy
against conventional chemotherapy. The overwhelming
public perception was that BCBS was only participating in
these trials as a way to avoid paying for the high cost of
the treatment. As a result, the federal Office of Personnel
Management mandated that the plans could not require
coverage in the context of a clinical trial, i.e., that women
could receive coverage even if they were not enrolled in
the trial. This ruling both undermined the project and re-
duced enrollment [24].Conclusion
Though analyses of CED policies abound, and scholars
agree that it is rooted in a health services and research
paradigm, they often underemphasize the fact that it
operates primarily through political and economic rela-
tions. As the above debates reinforce, CED is a field of
knowledge but one whose boundaries are not yet settled
because its political and economic roots remain largely
ignored. As a result, tensions emerge in multiple areas
such as how evidence should be interpreted, the roles
and responsibilities of the various stakeholders and who
is responsible for funding decisions. These tensions can-
not be abstracted from the political and economic
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field but at the same time, hindering its ability to become
the method of choice for resolving the problem of funding
in the face of imperfect knowledge. As a result, “the legit-
imate scope of CED. . .. remains poorly defined” [6].
Understanding the barriers and potential of a CED frame-
work requires understanding the degree to which it is in-
trinsically rooted in the fluid and constant exchange of
power by virtue of its relationship with government and the
other stakeholders who operate within the sphere of CED.
Foucault once wrote that, “knowledge, once used to regu-
late the conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and
the disciplining of practice” [12]. Though the questions
posed by our interviewees were explicitly referencing the
process of CED, these same sentiments beg questions sur-
rounding the nature of the power-relations that implicitly
regulate and constrain stakeholders, decision makers, and
researchers. Until the underlying political nature of CED is
recognized, the explicit and fundamental questions posed
by the interviewees about its usefulness and operation will
remain unresolved. To this end we feel that it is necessary
to redirect the research into the CED process to not only
examine its technical and ethical questions but also its pol-
itical ones. Future CED studies should be prospectively
planned to include an exploration of the political dimen-
sions of the environment in which the study is taking place
and to also involve an analysis of the interests of the various
stakeholders at various stages of the project.
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